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ABSTRACT
Since its creation, Bluetooth has transformed itself from a cable replacement
technology to a wireless technology that connects people and machines. Bluetooth
has been widely adapted on mobile phones and PDAs. Many other vendors in other
industries are integrating Bluetooth into their products. Although vendors are
adapting to the technology, Bluetooth hasn’t been a big hit among users. Security
remains a major concern. Poor implementation of the Bluetooth architecture on
mobile devices leads to some high profiled Bluetooth hacks. Weak security protocol
designs expose the Bluetooth system to some devastating protocol attacks.
This paper first explores four Bluetooth protocol-level attacks in order to get
deeper insights into the weakness of the Bluetooth security design. It then proposes
enhancements to defense against those attacks. Performance comparison will be
given based on the implementation of those enhancements on a software based
Bluetooth simulator.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Bluetooth, a short ranged wireless technology, was invented back in 1996. It
was originally designed to replace clumsy cables that connect computers. However,
the energy efficient nature of Bluetooth’s design makes Bluetooth a practical
technology to be applied on small portable mobile devices. The fact that Bluetooth
design requires no state of the art components makes it a low cost wireless solution
that can be widely afforded by the public [2, 11, 19]. Couple years ago, it was being
seen as one of the technologies that will revolutionize how mobile devices connects to
each other. Also, the fact that lots of big telecommunication moguls and software
giants have made huge investments into Bluetooth projects makes Bluetooth a
promising technology.
Bluetooth has been adapted by many different industries. Nowadays, lots of
mobile phones on the market are equipped with Bluetooth which allows them to
synchronize their data, such as phone books, wirelessly over a short range with other
mobile phones, computers, and handheld devices. According to IDC research, about
13 percent of mobile phones shipped in the United States have Bluetooth. The
number will grow to about 53 percent globally and 65 percent in United States by
2008 [21]. Some of the high-ended car models even have keyless entry and ignition
that utilize Bluetooth. Some models of BMW have built-in Bluetooth hands-free
system [14]. Microsoft has also started to have Bluetooth support after its XP SP1
release.
Although the Bluetooth technology can now be seen everywhere in our daily
lives, it has not gain any significant popularity from its users over the past few years.
Lots of people don’t even know what Bluetooth is. Vendors also haven’t aggressively
push Bluetooth out to the market. Most mobile phones have their Bluetooth features
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turned off by default so that only knowledge users will turn them on. Mobile phone
vendors recommend users to turn off the Bluetooth features on their mobiles when
they are not in use in order to minimize the risk of being attack by hackers. Bluetooth
designers also recommend people not to pair Bluetooth devices in public places. If
Bluetooth is such a great technology, why do vendors turn Bluetooth features off on
their mobile phones by default? Why can’t mobile users leave their Bluetooth
connections on 24 hours a day? The answer lies in the fact that the Bluetooth security
design is still insufficient for many applications.
Over the past few years, many security issues on Bluetooth have surfaced.
During 2004, the famous Cabir worms that target mobile phones spread themselves
through Bluetooth connections. British government required members of Parliament
to disable the Bluetooth functions on their mobile phones [43]. Typing the words
“bluetooth hack” on Google results in numerous links about all kinds of Bluetooth
attacks. The two famous Bluetooth attacks are Bluejack and Bluesnarf. Bluejack is
not exactly a hack. It does no real damage to its victims. A bluejacker merely abuses
the “Name” field, which is long enough to embed a message, on a Bluetooth
handshake packet to send anonymous messages to victims’ devices. Bluejackers
cannot steal information from their victims. Nor does the Bluejack attack allow
attackers to take control of victims’ devices [12, 13, 15]. The Bluesnarf attack, on the
other hand, allow attackers to steal confidential data, such as phone books, calendars,
images, pins, etc., from victims’ phones [13]. Bluetooth profiling allows attackers to
keep track of victims’ locations because each Bluetooth device is a transceiver with a
unique MAC address. Carrying a Bluetooth enabled mobile phone becomes tagging
oneself with a RFID tag. All these issues are painting a rather negative picture for
Bluetooth.
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2. HISTORY
Bluetooth was named after the 10th century Danish King Harald Bluetooth. It
was originally developed by Erission Mobile Communication. On 1998, a join
initiative from couple big telecommunication giants gave birth to the Bluetooth
Special Interest Group (Bluetooth SIG). The main goal of the Bluetooth SIG is to
standardize and regulates the Bluetooth technology. The number of members of the
Bluetooth SIG grew from a handful of companies, such as Ericsson, Nokia, Intel,
IBM, in 1998 to more than 3000 today [40].

3. TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW
Bluetooth data transmit on the unlicensed 2.4GHz ISM band. Bluetooth uses a
frequency-hopping scheme in order to minimize the interferences with other
technologies and applications such as 802.11, microwave ovens, cordless phones, etc.
The connection range of off-the-shelf Bluetooth devices vary from 10 meters to 100
meters. Their data rate varies from 1Mbps to 2Mbps. Each Bluetooth device has a
globally unique 48bit MAC address. The first 24 bits of the Bluetooth address is
vendor specific. Figure 3.1 shows a typical Bluetooth address.
Bluetooth is an ad hoc networking technology in which no fix infrastructure
(e.g. LAN) exists. Connections between Bluetooth devices are created “on the fly”.
There is a master and a slave in each Bluetooth connection. A Bluetooth master can
have up to 7 active slaves and unlimited passive (parked) slaves. Active slaves are
devices that are in sync with the master and are ready to communicate. A master and
its associated slaves form a piconet. A scatternet is formed by two or more piconets
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that share common Bluetooth nodes. Figure 3.2 shows the different types of
Bluetooth topology.
Bluetooth defines two procedures for establishing a connection between two
Bluetooth devices. A Bluetooth device first uses the inquiry procedure to discover
other close-by devices. It then uses the paging procedure to establish a connection
with a target device. Two Bluetooth nodes are considered to be in sync when they
share the same clock value and frequency-hopping pattern.

00:14:9A:C9:20:10
Figure 3.1. A Bluetooth MAC address

Figure 3.2. A scatternet consisting of two piconets

4. BLUETOOTH SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
4.1 DEVICE MODES
Bluetooth specification defines two device modes to control the visibility and
availability of Bluetooth devices. A device is in discoverable mode if it responses to
inquiries from other devices. Otherwise, it is in a non-discoverable mode. A device
is in a connectable mode if it responses to paging requests from other devices.
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Otherwise, it is in non-connectable mode. Paging will be explained further in the later
sections.

4.2 SECURITY MODES
Bluetooth specification defines three security modes to control when and
where authentication and encryption occur. In security mode 1, no authentication and
encryption will be initialized on any connections. This mode is being provided
mostly for Bluetooth devices where security is not necessary and is thus considered to
be an overhead. Bluetooth wireless mouse is one of those applications. Mode 2 is a
policy-based service level security mode. Security procedures are initialized only
after the connection establishment on the L2CAP level. By assigning different
security policies and trust levels to each connection, a Security manager control
access to a device and the services that the device offers. In essence, this security
mode provides authentication, confidentially, and authorization. Security mode 3
provides link level security. It is a build-in security mechanism that is transparent to
the upper application layers [41].

4.3 KEY MANAGEMENT
Bluetooth security architecture is based on the symmetric key cryptography
where two Bluetooth devices share a common link key for authentication and
encryption. Figure 4.3.1 shows the Bluetooth key structure.

4.3.1 Initialization Key
Bluetooth specification defines a pairing process for two Bluetooth devices
that have never establish any connection before to derive a common key for
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authentication and encryption. The initialization key (Kinit) is the first key being
generated in the pairing process. It is being used to derive combination / unit keys
later on in the pairing process. Once a combination / unit key is derived, the
initialization key will be discarded. Note that the strength of this key solely relies on
a 4 to 16 bytes PIN.

4.3.2 Combination / unit key
Combination keys (Kab) and unit keys (Ka) are semi-permanent in a sense that
devices store them permanently unless the they are being updated through the link key
update procedures or the broadcast encryption scheme. These keys can be reused in
multiple sessions by the devices that share them. The main difference between unit
keys and combination keys is that two different random numbers, one from the master
and the other from the slave, are used to derive combination keys. In other words,
combination keys are unique for each connection. On the other hand, unit keys are
generated by a single device and can be shared by different Bluetooth connections.
Due to the inherited insecure nature of unit keys, the usage of unit keys is being
depreciated.

4.3.3 Master key
Sometimes it is desirable for a master of a piconet to encrypt broadcast traffic.
But using combination keys to encrypt broadcast traffic involves the overhead of
encrypting the same packet using different combination keys associated with different
slaves. Bluetooth specification defines shared master keys to allow piconet masters to
encrypt broadcast traffic. Copies of a single master key are distributed to all the
slaves within a piconet. The master then uses the master key to encrypt payloads and
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broadcast them to all the slaves. As a result, the master has avoided the overhead of
using combination keys to encrypt broadcast traffic.

4.3.4 Encryption Key
Encryption keys (Kc) are derived from the current link keys and are
automatically updated each time the devices enter the encryption mode. KC is used to
generate cipher stream KCipher that in turn will be XORed with payloads.

Figure 4.3.1. Bluetooth key structure
4.4 SAFER+
SAFER+, invented by Cylink Corporation, is a modified version of SAFER block
cipher. It was one of the 15 submissions of AES [10]. Bluetooth security architecture
uses SAFER+ in all key generating hash functions. SAFER+ has three main parts:
1. A Key Scheduling Algorithm (KSA) which takes a 128 bit key and generates
17 different sub-keys (K1 to K17 in Figure 4.4.1)
2. Eight identical rounds. Each round takes two keys from KSA and a 128 bit
input value to generate a 128-bit output. The inner design of each SAFER+
round is showed in Figure 4.4.2.
3. The 128-bit output from the last round is XORed with K17 to produce the final
128 bit output
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Note that the Bluetooth design uses two slightly different versions of SAFER+
(Ar and Ar’). Ar represents the original design of SAFER+, which is being shown in
Figure 4.4.2. Ar’ differs with Ar only in the design of Round 3. In Ar’, the 128-bit
input value of round 3 is XORed with the input value of round 1 such that Ar’
becomes non-invertible [2]. Figure 4.4.3 shows the inner design of Ar’.

Figure 4.4.1 The inner design of SAFER+ block cipher (Ar) [1]

Figure 4.4.2 The inner design of a SAFER+ round [1]
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Figure 4.4.3 The inner designed of the slightly modified SAFER+ (Ar’) [1]

4.5 HASH FUNCTIONS
Four hash functions are used in pairing, authentication, and encryption. The
heart of all four functions is a SAFER+ block cipher.

4.5.1 E22
Bluetooth design uses E22 to generate initialization keys (Kinit). The equation
that depicts the design of E22 is shown in Figure 4.5.1. E22 takes a 48-bit Bluetooth
address (BD_ADDR), a PIN, and a 128 bit random number (RAND) to generate a
128-bit Kinit. The maximum size of PIN is 16 bytes. If PIN’s size (L) is less than 16
bytes, it will first combined with BD_ADDR to form PIN’. If PIN’ is still less than
16 bytes, it will then be expanded cyclically to become a 16 byte PIN’’ (or “X” in
Figure 4.5.1). The 15th byte of RAND is XORed with the L’, which is the lesser
number between 16 (the maximum size of a PIN) and L + 6 (6 is the size BD_ADDR),
to form Y. X and Y will then be feed into Ar’ to create a 128-bit Kinit [1,2].
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Figure 4.5.1 Equations of E22 [2]
(PIN, L)

(BD ADDR, 6)

Combine PIN & BD_ADDR
memcpy(pin’, pin, L);
usedAddrSize = MIN(6, 16 – L);
memcpy(pin’ + L, BD_ADDR, usedAddrSize);
L’ = L + usedAddrSize;

(IN RAND, 16)

XOR IN_RAND’s most
significant bytes with the size of
PIN
IN RAND[15] ^= L

(IN_RAND’, 16)
(PIN’, L’)

Expand PIN’ to 16 bytes (if necessary)
if ( L’ < 16 )
{
for (int i = 0; i < 16; i ++)
PIN’’[i] = PIN’[ i mod L’];
}

Ar’
(PIN’’, 16)

(Kinit, 16)

Figure 4.5.2 A graphical representation of E22
4.5.2 E21
Bluetooth design uses E21 to generate unit keys (LK_KA/LK_KB). The
equation that depicts the design of E21 is shown in Figure 4.5.3. E21 takes a 128-bit
15

random number (RAND) and a 48-bit Bluetooth address (address) as its input. The
15th byte of RAND is XORed with a constant number 6 (the size of a Bluetooth
address in byte) to form X. “address” is being cyclically expanded from 6 bytes to 16
bytes to form Y. X and Y are then being feed to Ar’ to create a unit key. Two unit
keys (LK_KA and LK_KB) will then be combined to form a combination key Kab [1,
2].

Figure 4.5.3 Equation of E21 [2]
(LK RAND, 16)

(BD_ADDR, 6)

Expand BD_ADDR to 16 bytes
for (int i = 0; i < 16; i ++)
BD_ADDR’[i] = PIN’[ i mod 6];

(BD ADDR, 16)
XOR LK_RAND’s most
significant bytes with the size
of BD_ADDR

(LK RAND’, 16)

Ar’

LK_RAND[15] ^= 6

(LK K, 16)

Figure 4.5.4 A graphical representation of E21
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4.5.3 E1
Bluetooth design uses E1 to generate authentication responses (SRES). The
equation that depicts the design of E1 is shown in Figure 4.5.5. E1 takes a 128-bit
combination key (K), a 128-bit random number (RAND), and a Bluetooth address
(address) as its inputs. RAND and K from Figure 4.5.6 are being feed to Ar. The
128-bit output is XORed with RAND and then added with a cyclically expanded
address (Ar_out). Transforming K with an offset table will form K’. The complete
offset table can be found in the Bluetooth specification. Ar_out and K’ are being feed
to Ar’ to generate a 128 bit value. The first 32 bit of that value will become SRES.
The rest of the 128-bit output value will become ACO [1, 2].

Figure 4.5.5 Equations of E1 [2]
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(K, 16)

(AU RAND, 16)

(BD ADDR, 6)

Ar
Expand BD_ADDR to 16 bytes
for (int i = 0; i < 16; i ++)
BD_ADDR’[i] = PIN’[ i mod 6];

16 XOR
Offset
Refer to Bluetooth
specification

16 additions modulo 256
(BD ADDR’, 16)

Ar’

(K’, 16)

32 bits

(SRES, 4)

96 bits

(ACO, 12)

Figure 4.5.6 A graphical representation of E1
4.5.4 E3
Bluetooth design uses a hash function E3 to generate ciphering key Kc , which
will then be used by system E0 to generate cipher streams for encrypting message
payloads in encryption. The equations that depict the design of E1 are shown in
Figure 4.5.7. K is the current link key. RAND is a 128bit random number that is
generated by the master. Depends on the type of encryption (i.e. point to point or
point to multi-points), COF is either the union of the master’s address or the ACO
generated by the previous authentication.
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Figure 4.5.7 Equations of E3 [2]
4.6 PAIRING
Before two Bluetooth devices can establish a connection and send data to each
other, they have to go through a pairing procedure, which is essentially a process for
creating a common key for authentication and encryption between two Bluetooth
devices. The device that initializes the pairing is, by definition, the master of the
whole process. The other device is considered to be the slave [1, 2]. Two Keys, Kinit
and Kab, are being generated from the process. Figure 4.6.1 and 4.6.2 show a
simplified and a detailed pairing respectively.
An overview of the pairing process is described as follows:

Index:
Bluetooth Address – A 48 bit mac address that uniquely identify each
individual Bluetooth device
BD_ADDRA – The Bluetooth address of the master
BD_ADDRB – The Bluetooth address of the slave

1. User A enters a PIN to the master (Device A) Bluetooth device
2. The master generates a 128 bit random number (IN_RAND)
3. The master uses IN_RAND along with the PIN and BD_ADDRB to generate
an initialization key (Kinit)
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4. The master sends IN_RAND to the slave
5. User B enters the same PIN as User A did to the slave device
6. The slave uses the PIN, IN_RAND, and it’s own address BD_ADDRB to
generate the same Kinit. At this point, both the master and the slave share the
same initialization key.
7. The master generates a new 128 bit random number (LK_RANDA)
8. The master uses LK_RANDA along with BD_ADDRA to generate a unit link
key (Ka)
9. The master encrypts LK_RANDA by using Kinit
10. The master sends the encrypted LK_RANDA to the slave
11. The slave decrypts the encrypted random number by using its own Kinit
12. The slave generates Ka by using LK_RANDA and BD_ADDRA
13. The slave generates a new 128 bit random number LK_RANDB
14. The slave uses LK_RANDB along with BD_ADDRB to generate Kb
15. At this point, the slave has both Ka and Kb. It XOR two unit link keys to form
a new 128 bit combination key Kab
16. The slave encrypts LK_RANDB by using Kinit
17. The slave sends the encrypted LK_RANDB to the master
18. The master decrypts the encrypted LK_RANDB by using its own Kinit
19. The master generates Kb by using LK_RANDB and BD_ADDRB.
20. At this point, the master has both Ka and Kb. It XOR two unit link keys to
form the same combination key Kab
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M

S

Enter PIN

Enter PIN
IN_RAND

Kinit

Kinit
LK_RANDA
LK_RANDB

KAB

KAB

Pairing completed

Figure 4.6.1 A simplified Bluetooth pairing protocol
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Master A (BD ADDRA )

Slave B (BD ADDRB )

User A enters PIN
Generate a 128-bit random number (IN_RAND)

E22( BD_ADDRB + PIN + IN_RAND ) Î Kinit
Send IN_RAND in plaintext
User B enters PIN
E22( BD_ADDRB + PIN + IN_RAND ) Î Kinit

Generate a 128 bit random number (LK_RANDA)

E21 ( BD_ADDRA + LK_RANDA ) Î Ka

LK_RANDA XOR Kinit Î LK_RANDA’
Send LK_RANDA’
LK_RANDA’ XOR Kinit Î LK_RANDA

E21 (BD_ADDRA + LK_RANDA ) Î Ka

Generate a 128 bit random number (LK RANDB)
E21( BD_ADDRB + LK_RANDB ) Î KB

Kb XOR Kb Î Kab
LK_RANDB XOR Kinit Î LK_RANDB’
Send LK_RANDB’
LK_RANDB’ XOR Kinit Î LK_RANDB

E21( BD_ADDRB + LK_RANDB ) Î Kb

Ka XOR Kb Î Kab

Pairing completed

Figure 4.6.2 A detailed Bluetooth pairing protocol
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4.7 AUTHENTICATION
Bluetooth security architecture uses a challenge-response authentication
scheme. Figure 4.7.1 and 4.7.2 show a simplified and a detailed authentication
respectively.
An overview of the authentication process is described as follows:
1. The master is the verifier. The slave is the claimant.
2. The master generates a 128 bit random number AU_RANDA
3. The master uses AU_RANDA along with Kab and BD_ADDRB to compute a
32 bit values SRESA
4. The master sends AU_RANDA to the slave as plaintext
5. The slave computes a 32 bit response SRESA’ using AU_RANDA, Kab, and
BD_ADDRB.
6. The slave sends the SRESA’ back to the master
7. The master compares the SRESA’ it received from the slave against SRESA to
verify the validity of the slave’s Kab
8. Upon the success in verifying the validity of slave’s KAB, a new round of
authentication begins. This time, the slave becomes the verifier. The master
becomes the claimant
9. The slave generates a 128 bit random number AU_RANDB
10. The slave uses AU_RANDB along with Kab and BD_ADDRA to compute a 32
bit values SRESB
11. The slave sends AU_RANDB to the master
12. The master computes SRESB’ using AU_RANDB, Kab, and it’s own address
BD_ADDRA.
13. The master sends SRESB’ back to the slave
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14. The slave compares SRESB’ against SRESB to verify the validity of the
master’s Kab
15. Upon the success in verifying the validity of master’s KAB, a mutual
authentication is completed

M

S
AU_RANDA
SRESA’
AU_RANDB
SRESB’

Authentication Complete

Figure 4.7.1 A simplified Bluetooth authentication protocol
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Master A (BD ADDRA )

Slave B (BD ADDRB )

Generate a 128 bit random number (AU_RANDA)
E1( BD_ADDRB + AU_RANDA + Kab )Î SRESA
Send AU_RANDA in plaintext
E1( BD_ADDRB + AU_RANDA + Kab )Î SRES?
Send SRES? in plaintext

NO.
Stop pairing

SRESA == SRES?
YES

Generate a 128 bit random number (AU_RANDB)
E1( BD_ADDRA + AU_RANDB+ Kab ) Î SRESB
Send AU_RANDB in plaintext

E1( BD_ADDRA + AU_RANDB + Kab ) Î SRES?
Send SRES? in plaintext

SRESB == SRES?

NO.
Stop pairing

YES
Mutual Authentication Completed

Figure 4.7.2 A detailed Bluetooth authentication protocol
4.8 ENCRYPTION
After at least one authentication has been performed, encryption can be used
to protect message payloads. The master first negotiates the encryption key size with
the slave. The master and the slave then derive the same ciphering key Kc. Kc will be
used by the E0 system to generate cipher streams (Kcipher) for encrypting packet
payloads. Figure 4.8.1 shows the encryption procedure.
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Figure 4.8.1 An overview of Bluetooth encryption protocol [1]

5 RESEARCH
This research first explores four Bluetooth security issues through the analysis
and implementation of four attacks. The first attack is a passive PIN cracking attack.
The attack attempts to use an offline brute-force approach to recover the secret PIN
that is shared by two Bluetooth devices during their paring process. The second
attack is an active version of the first attack. Instead of taking the PIN calculation
offline, an attacker attempts to pair with a victim device repeatedly in a short period
of time using different PINs until he recovered the secret PIN. Since those
consecutive pairings happens in real time, speed will become a crucial factor in this
attack. Thus, a PIN dictionary will be used along with this attack to enhance the PIN
recovery speed. The third attack is a denial-of-service attack. The attack attempts to
prevent legitimate users from connecting to a master Bluetooth device (e.g. a
Bluetooth access point). The fourth attack is an encrypted message replay attack.
The main goal of this attack is to make a victim do the same thing twice using some

26

previously captured messages. All these messages are encrypted. The attack does not
need to know the current link key in order to carry out this attack.
After the analysis and implementations of those attacks, this research then
suggests some security improvements to defense against those four attacks.

5.1 ENVIRONMENT
The research is based upon an open-sourced Bluetooth network simulator
named UCBT, which stands for University of Cincinnati – Bluetooth [3]. There are
two other open-sourced Bluetooth simulators available for download on the Internet.
Bluehoc, which was developed by IBM in 1996, is the first generation of Bluetooth
simulator [4]. A newer simulator is named Blueware, which is a project from couple
MIT students [5]. Both Blueware and UCBT are built on top of Bluehoc. All three
simulators incorporate the framework provided by NS-2, a well-known network
simulator [7]. UCBT is chosen for this research because it is the most updated
Bluetooth simulator that is designed based on the more widely adapted Bluetooth 1.1
and 1.2 specifications.
UCBT is designed for the Linux platform. It is written in C++. In this
research, Linux Mandrake 10.0 [8] is being selected to host UCBT because it is
notorious for the ease of its installation and configuration. Mandrake is installed as a
virtual host operating system on VMWare [9] so that the research can be conducted in
Windows’ environment. The Bluetooth design incorporates SAFER+ as the core
block cipher for couple encryption and key generation functions such as E22, E21, E1,
etc. More detailed information regarding those functions is discussed in the previous
sections. The codes for SAFER+ in UCBT are being extracted from a cryptographic
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library named “LibTomCrypt” [8]. Table 5.1.1 provides a summary of the research
environment.
UCBT is specifically designed to simulate the Baseband Bluetooth stack layer.
The Bluetooth architecture divides into three distinct layers. A L2CAP layer, which
stands for Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol, sits on the top of the stack.
The main function of the L2CAP layer is to create and manage channels for the
application layer, which is not considered to be a part of the Bluetooth architecture. A
radio layer lies on the bottom of the stack. It contains a radio transceiver that
transmits and receives Bluetooth packets. A baseband layer lies in between the
L2CAP layer and the radio layer. It contains a scheduler that grants time slots for the
L2CAP channels to send packets through the radio layer. It negotiates quality of
services between Bluetooth entities. It is also responsible for encoding and decoding
Bluetooth packets [2]. UCBT relies on NS-2 to provide the L2CAP layer that it needs.
The radio layer and the physical wireless medium that allows Bluetooth devices to
connect to each other are not being simulated [3].
One of the major challenges for using UCBT in this research is the fact that
UCBT’s designers intentionally bypassed all the security aspects of the Bluetooth
specification. In other words, the original UCBT package does not contain any
modules for pairing, authentication, and encryption. As part of this research, pairing,
authentication, and encryption (based on the Bluetooth 1.2 specification) have been
added to the simulator.
In order to verify that all security modules have been implemented correctly,
couple test samples from the Bluetooth 1.2 specification have been used. Figure 5.1.1
shows a sample input and its associated output for the E22 function. The inputs of
E22 from the sample test data are a 128 bit random number (rand), a 16-byte pin
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(PIN), and a 48-bit Bluetooth address (address). In the figure, “round 1” represents
the input value for the first round in Ar’. Each SAFER+ round requires two keys.
“Key [1]” and “Key [2]” represent the two input keys for the first round. The
expected final key is represented by “Ka”. The rest of the test sets can be found in
Part G, Vol 2 of the Bluetooth 1.2 specification [2].

●
●
●
Figure 5.1.1 A sample test data for E22 [2]
Virtual Machine Software
Host Operating System
Network Simulator
Bluetooth Simulator
SAFER+
Compliers

VMWare Workstation 5.0.0 build 13124
Mandrake 10.0
NS-2 version 2.27
UCBT 0.9.8.2
LibTomCrypt 1.06
gcc & g++

Table 5.1.1 Summary of all software used in the research
5.2 ATTACKS
5.2.1 Passive PIN cracking
This passive pin-cracking analysis was first being disclosed to the public by O.
Whitehose at the CanSecWest ’04 conference. At that time, only the attack
framework and its performance analysis were discussed [20]. Two researchers, Yaniv
Shaked and Avishai Wool, followed the lead and made a more detailed analysis of the
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Bluetooth pin attack. They implemented a pin-cracking program along with couple
speed improvements on their algorithm. They tested and evaluated their program
against pins that are 4 to 7 digits long [1]. Since they did not release the source codes
of their cracking program to the public, an independent implementation of the
cracking program is included in this research. All Bluetooth pairing messages that are
needed by the pin-cracking algorithm are summarized in Table 5.2.1.
The pin-cracking algorithm is a brute-force algorithm. It repeatedly generates
different hypothetical PIN’ and goes through a series of pairing and authentication
steps to generate hypothetical SRES’. It then compares the hypothetical SRES’ with
SRESA and SRESB in order to recover the correct PIN [1]. Notice that the algorithm
assumes that the attacker has successfully eavesdropped the entire pairing process and
has retrieved all the necessary messages that are listed in Table 5.2.1. Figure 5.2.1
describes the complete pin-cracking process. Since the Bluetooth specification
requires the length of the pins to be at least 4 digits, the crack program starts to
enumerate all possible pin combinations from the pin “0000”. Some performance
improvement codes have been added to the SAFER+ that is being used by the crack
program. Figure 5.2.2 shows the pseudo codes for the crack program. The following
assumption has been made for the attack:

1. The attacker has eavesdropped the entire pairing process between the targets.
2. The following data are known prior to the pin cracking starts
•

The Bluetooth address of both master and slave (BD_ADDRA and
BD_ADDRB)

•

All messages listed in Table 1

•

The internal designs of E22, E21, and E1
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#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Src
Master
Master
Slave
Master
Slave
Slave
Master

Dst
Slave
Slave
Master
Slave
Master
Master
Slave

Data
IN_RAND
LK_RANDA
LK_RANDB
AU_RANDA
SRESA
AU_RANDB
SRESB

Length (bit)
128
128
128
128
32
128
32

Notes
Plaintext
XORed with Kinit
XORed with Kinit
Plaintext
Plaintext
Plaintext
Plaintext

Table 5.2.1 Messages used by the pairing process [1]
// Load all sniffed messages
in_rand
= getMsg(IN_RAND);
// in_rand for Kinit
encrypted_lk_rand_a
= getMsg(E_LK_RAND_A); // encrypted LK_RAND_A
encrypted_lk_rand_b
= getMsg(E_LK_RAND_B); // encrypted LK_RAND_B
au_rand_a
= getMsg(AU_RAND_A); // authentication AU_RAND_A
au_rand_b
= getMsg(AU_RNAD_B); // authentication AU_RAND_B
sres_expected_a = getMsg(SRES_A);
// response SRES_A
sres_expected_b = getMsg(SRES_B);
// response SRES_B
pin_found = false;
while(!pin_found)
{
// Guess a new pin
guess_pin = GetNewPin();
// Initialisation key (Kinit)
key_init = E22(guess_pin, slave_addr, in_rand);
// Decrypt random numbers using Kinit
lk_rand_a = XOR(encrypted_lk_rand_a, key_init);
lk_rand_b = XOR(encrypted_lk_rand_b, key_init);
// Generate unit keys Ka and Kb
key_a = E21(master_addr, lk_rand_a);
key_b = E21(slave_addr, lk_rand_b);
// Generate combination key Kab
key_ab = XOR(key_a, key_b);
// Generate authentication response using
// master-generated random number
sres_a = E1(au_rand_a, slave_addr, key_ab);
// Compare guessed authentication response with
// the expected one
if( sameResponse(sres_a, sres_expected_a))
{
// Generate authentication response using
// slave-generated random number
sres_b = E1(au_rand_b, master_addr, key_ab);
// Compare guessed authentication response with
// the expected one
if( sameResponse(sres_b, sres_expected_b))
pin_found = true;
}
}

Figure 5.2.2 Pseudo codes for the passive pin-cracking program
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Generate a hypothetical PIN (PIN’)

Generate a hypothetical Kinit’
E22( BD_ADDRB + PIN’ + IN_RAND ) Î Hypothetical Kinit’

Decrypted the two random numbers
Kinit’ XOR encrypted-LK_RANDA Î LK_RANDA’
&&
Kinit’ XOR encrypted-LK_RANDB Î LK_RANDB’

Generate two hypothetical unit link keys
BD_ADDRA + LK_RANDA’ Î E21 Î Ka ’
&&
BD_ADDRB + LK_RANDB’ Î E21 Î Kb’

Create a hypothetical combination key Kab’
Ka ’ XOR Kb’ Î Kab’

Generate a hypothetical authentication response SRESA’
BD_ADDRB + AU_RANDA + Kab’ Î E1 Î SRESA’

SRESA == SRESA’

NO

Yes

Generate a hypothetical authentication response SRESA’
BD_ADDRA + AU_RANDB + Kab’ Î E1 Î SRESB’

SRESB == SRESB’

NO

Yes

Found PIN

Figure 5.2.1 The passive PIN-cracking algorithm
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The following are the results of running the pin-cracking program against
messages that were encrypted with different pin sizes.

Seconds
1000
100
10
Digit-pin sizes
4

5

6

7

Figure 5.2.3 Performance measurement of the crack program
against different sized pins

5.2.2 Active PIN cracking
Some Bluetooth devices, such as hands-free headphones, do not have a user
interface. Thus, manufactures have to embed fixed PINs into those devices. The
Bluetooth specification specifies that two devices cannot be paired if both of them
have fixed PINs. In other words, for a pairing to occur, at least one device has to have
a variable PIN. This active PIN attack is specifically targeting the fix-pined Bluetooth
devices.
As the name implies, the attack involves communicating actively with the
victim. The nature of this attack is very similar with the passive PIN attack. For the
passive attack, the calculation is being taken offline. For this active attack, an
attacker will initialize a pairing and an authentication with a victim device using a
random PIN. Notice that the attacker is always the master. It means that the attacker
should always be the first one who send out the challenge and receive the response in
an mutual authentication. Once the attacker completed one pairing and collected a
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pair of challenge and response for authentication, he will have enough information to
launch a brute-force attack. If the attacker can retrieve the PIN before the challenge
from the victim expires, she can generate a correct response to complete the
authentication. If not, the attacker will have to initialize another round of pairing and
authentication. In order to prevent intruders from trying a large number of different
pins in a short period of time, the Bluetooth design specifies that a wait interval
should be passed before a device response to an authentication attempts coming from
the same claimant who has failed the authentication. The wait interval should also be
exponentially increased [2]. Therefore, the attacker’s MAC address will be stored in
the victims’ “Black List” in the subsequence rounds of failed pairing and
authentication. But the only information that the victim can use to uniquely identify
each failed attempt is the MAC address. An attacker can bypass the wait interval as
long as he uses a different Mac address for each authentication attempt. To minimize
the number of rounds, the attack can utilize a numeric pin dictionary and generates
more common PIN candidates such as “1111”, “1234”, etc. Figure 5.2.4 shows the
active PIN- cracking algorithm.
Since this active attack is very similar to the offline version of the PIN
cracking and the offline version is much more efficient than the online one, one might
wonder why the attacker would use this active attack at all. The reason is that
sometimes it may not be easy, if not impossible, for the attacker to eavesdrop the
complete pairing process between two target devices.
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Attacker

Victim

Generate any pin (PIN’)

Uses a fix pin (PIN)

Pairing
Start Mutual Authentication

Generate an AU_RAND
Send AU_RAND
Generate a SRESA’
Send SRESA’

Launch brute-force attack to
retrieve PIN

Generate an AU_RANDB and
calculate SRESB using PIN

Send AU RANDB

Generate a SRESB’ based on PIN,
otherwise, use any random pin.

Send SRESB’

SRESB == SRESB’

Setup Complete
Stop

NO

YES

Stop
Detach link
Reason = AUTH FAILED

Figure 5.2.4 The active PIN-attack algorithm
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5.2.3 Denial-of-Service Attack
The main goal for this attack is to flood a master Bluetooth device, such as an
access point, with false authentications in attempt to prevent legitimate users from
successfully pairing and authenticating with that master device. An attacker can
accomplish this attack by taking advantages of the security measurement that is
designed to prevent repeated authentication attempts with different PINs in a
relatively short period of time.
To prevent repeated authentication, a device is recommended to store the
MAC address that is associated with each failed authentication attempt. A wait time
should pass before the device accepts new authentication requests from any of those
MAC addresses. If the attacker uses the MAC address of a legitimate user and a fake
PIN to authenticate with the master access point, the authentication will most likely
fail. The access point will then “memorize” the MAC address of the legitimate user.
In consequence, the access point will reject any further pairing and authentication
requests coming from the legitimate user until the wait time has passed.
Bluetooth MAC addresses are 48 bits long. There are roughly 248 unique MAC
addresses. It would be impractical for the attacker to flood the access point using all
possible addresses. But let say that the access point belongs to a mid-size company.
The company will mostly provide its employees with Bluetooth devices manufactured
by couple specific companies. Since the first three bytes of a Bluetooth MAC address
are vendor specific, the attacker will only have to loop through all possible addresses
(around 16 million addresses) from those brands. Furthermore, some companies
assign fixed 7th hex digit to the address of their products. For example, Sony Ericsson
uses 00:0A:D9:E as the first 7 hex digits of the MAC address of their P900 mobile
phones [42]. To speed up the denial-of-service attack further, a couple of probing
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Bluetooth devices, each one target a different address range, can be used. Figure
5.2.5 describes a normal scenario of a legitimate device connects to an access point.
Figure 5.2.6 shows the denial-of-service attack.

Legitimate User

Access Point
Inquiry
Paging

Role: Master

Role: Slave
Connection request
Role Preferred?
Master

Role Preferred: Master

Master

Slave / No
Preference

Role Preferred?
Slave / No Preference
Accept role switch

Detach

Role Switch
Role: Slave

Role: Master
Accept connection request

Pairing
Authentication
Connection Setup Completed

Figure 5.2.5 A legitimate device connects to an access point
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Attacker

Access Point
Paging

Select a new mac
address

Role Switch
Pairing & Authentication
Detach: AUTH_FAILED
Store MAC address

Figure 5.2.6 The Denial-of-Service Attack
5.2.4 Message Replay Attack
In this attack, an attacker replays previously captured messages to a victim
without actually decrypting those messages. The attacker does not need to know the
encryption key to conduct this attack [27]. This attack divides into two phases as
follows:
Phase I:
Two victims (Alice & Bob) are attempting to set up a secure connection. We
assume that they have previously paired and they share a secret link key (K). We
further assume that Alice is the master of the piconet. Figure 5.2.7 depicts the
interactions between Alice and Bob in Phase I. Alice and Bob first mutually
authenticate each other using the secret key. Alice then initializes the encryption
sequence by sending Bob a random number EN_RAND. They calculate Kc and
KCipher using E3 and E0 respectively. They then encrypt the rest of the messages by
XORing the payloads with the cipher streams. The attacker, Trendy, passively listens
to the whole conversation between Alice and Bob. The messages and random
numbers that Trendy needs (all red messages in Figure 5.2.7) to launch the Phase II
attack are AU_RANDA, EN_RAND, and the rest of the encrypted messages.
Phase II:
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In this phase, Trendy initializes a mutual authentication with Bob. Trendy
send AU_RANDA, which he captured during Phase I, to Bob as the challenge such
that Bob generates the same ACOA and SRESA as in Phase I. Trendy then ignores the
response SRESA coming from Bob. Since Trendy doesn’t know K, he has no way to
generate a correct response to Bob. But Trendy can relay the challenge to Alice
posing as Bob and forwards the response from Alice to Bob. After the mutual
authentication between Trendy and Bob has completed, Trendy sends the same
encryption random number EN_RAND that he captured in Phase I to Bob. A key
observation here is that since ACOA and EN_RAND in Phase II are the same as those
in Phase I, the KC and KCipher that Bob generates in Phase II will also be the same as
those in Phase I. Trendy can then replay the rest of the messages that he captured in
Phase I to Bob. Figure 5.2.8 depicts the entire Phase II attack.
This attack poses some serious threats despite the fact that Trendy cannot
decrypt those encrypted messages. For example, Trendy can force Bob to send data
in plaintext by sending him an old encrypted STOP_ENCRYPTION command.
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Alice

Trendy

Bob

AU_RANDA

SRESA

E1(….,AU_RANDA)Î (SRESA , ACOA)

…
AU_RANDB
E1(….,AU_RANDB)Î (SRESB , ACOB)
SRESB
…
EN_RAND
E3(K, ACOA, EN_RAND)Î KC

E3(K, ACOA, EN_RAND)Î KC

E0(BD_ADDRA, CLKA, KC)Î KCipher

E0(BD_ADDRA, CLKA, KC)Î KCipher
Msg1 XOR KCipher

MsgN XOR KCipher

Figure 5.2.7 Phase I of the message Replay Attack
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Alice

Trendy

Bob
AU_RANDA
E1(….,AU_RANDA)Î (SRESA , ACOA)
SRESA
AU_RANDC

AU_RANDC
SRESC
SRESC
…
EN_RAND
E3(K, ACOA, EN_RAND)Î KC
E0(BD_ADDRA, CLKA, KC)Î KCipher
Msg1 XOR KCipher

MsgN XOR KCipher

Figure 5.2.8 Phase II of the message Replay Attack

6 ENHANCEMENTS
In this section, several enhancements to the Bluetooth security protocol will be
proposed in attempt to defense against the attacks described in the previous section.
All proposed enhancements are on the protocol level. In other words, all lowerleveled cryptographic features and functions, such as the SAFER+ block cipher and
various hash functions, will not be discussed.

6.1 Online/offline PIN attacks
Two different enhancements to the Bluetooth pairing and authentication
protocols are proposed to address both online and offline PIN attacks. The first
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enhancement is based on the Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) protocol suggested by
Steven Bellovin and Michael Merritt [28, 29, 30]. The second enhancement is based
on MANA III (MANual Authentication III), a multi-channel authentication protocol
[23, 24, 25, 26]. The Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol is the foundation of both
enhancements.

6.1.1 Password-based Encrypted Key Exchange (PW-EKE)
A. Overview
The goal of the password-based EKE protocol is to exchange a common key
between two parties over an insecure channel, such as a wireless interface, using a
shared weak PIN number, such as a 4 digit PIN. That is exactly what the pairing
process in the Bluetooth design trying to accomplish. The design of PW-EKE
incorporates the usage of both symmetric and asymmetric systems. Figure 6.1.1
shows the modified pairing and authentication using password-based EKE.
PW-EKE is based on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. A master (M)
and a slave (S) try to derive gAB mod p as their common session key by exchanging gA
mod p and gB mod p in plaintext. Doing so will not weaken the protocol because (gA
mod p) (gB mod p) does not equal (gAB mod p). To recover the key using those two
random numbers, the attack will have to solve the discrete log problem. But the
Diffie-Hellman key exchange does not provide authentication. Thus, it is prone to the
Man-In-The-Middle (MiM) attack. PW-EKE solves this problem by hashing the two
random numbers with a common PIN. A simple XOR operation will suffice because
the randomness of the two random numbers will provide enough security to protect
the weak PIN number. Furthermore, by hashing PIN numbers to the two random
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numbers, the strength of those PINs has been “amplified”. An important property of
this protocol is that weak PINs (such as a 4 digit PIN) will not weaken the protocol.
M

S

Generate a 128 bit random number A

Generate a 128 bit random number B
XOR (gA mod p , PIN)
XOR (gB mod p , PIN)

Extract gB mod p

Extract gA mod p

K = g(B)A mod p

K = g(A)B mod p
AU_RANDA
SRESA
AU_RANDA
SRESB

Figure 6.1.1 PW-EKE Based Pairing and Authentication Protocol
B. PW-EKE against different attack scenarios
This subsection demonstrates how the new protocol defense against different
attacks.
i) Man-In-the-Middle attack
The Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol is known to be vulnerable to the
MiM attack because it does not provide authentication. Thus, we first have to make
sure that the new protocol is well protected against the MiM attack. Figure 6.1.2
shows how MiM works under the original DH protocol. In the new protocol, a PIN is
used to provide authentication between the master and the slave. The long random
numbers, in return, protect the PIN. Since Trendy doesn’t know the PIN, he can’t
extract the two random numbers from the hashes.
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Alice

Trendy
A

K = g(Y)A mod p

Bob
X

g mod p

g mod p

gY mod p

gB mod p
K1 = g(A)Y mod p
K2 = g(B)X mod p

K = g(X)B mod p

Figure 6.1.2 A MiM attack under the original DH protocol
ii) Brute-Force PIN attack
The feasibility of a brute-force PIN attack depends on how quickly an attacker
can verify the correctness of a candidate PIN. Assuming the wireless interface is
completely insecure, an attacker will be able to capture every message. Figure 6.1.3
shows how an attacker attempts to launch a brute-force search on the PIN number.
Notice that step 3 is not feasible. The attacker has no way to verify the correctness of
a candidate PIN. Thus, a brute-force PIN attack cannot be applied on PW-EKE.
1. Generate a candidate PIN (pin’)

2. Calculate two candidate random numbers
pin'-1 (pin (gA) ) Î gA’
pin'-1 (pin (gB) ) Î gB’

3. Calculate a candidate gAB’ ** Infeasible **

4. Calculate a candidate authentication response
E1 (BD_ADDR, gAB’, AU_RANDA) Î SRES’

5. SRES’ == SREAA

NO

YES

6. PIN found

Figure 6.1.3 An attempted brute-force PIN search under PW-EKE

44

iii) Brute-force attack against A & B
An attacker can potentially retrieve the link key gAB by generating candidate A
and B and verify them against the challenge and response pair. But since A and B are
long nonces (128 bits), this attack is not feasible.

C. Pros and Cons
A major benefit of PW-EKE is that weak PINs will not weaken the whole
protocol. From the brute-force PIN attack in the previous section, we concluded that
short PINs make the original Bluetooth security weak. In PW-EKE, the main purpose
for the PINs is to provide authentication. The strength of the session keys does not
depend on the length of the PINs. Given how often users pick short PINs, this benefit
gives PW-EKE an edge over other protocols.
In terms of modification, PW-EKE does not require any changes to the
original device interface requirement. The new protocol also needs users to enter PINs
to both the master and the slave during a pairing process. For devices that have no
keypads, such as headsets, the fixed-pin scheme from the original Bluetooth
specification can be applied. In addition, the original challenge-response
authentication procedures can also be reused.

6.1.2 MANA III variant (MANual Authentication III)
A. Overview
The original Bluetooth pairing and authentication protocol can be seen as
having two communication channels. The first one is an insecure wireless channel
that has unlimited bandwidth because there is theoretically no limit on how much data
can be exchanged through this channel. The other channel is a physical channel
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where PINs are being entered. This channel has a very limited bandwidth because
people hate to remember long numbers and they hate to enter long numbers using tiny
keypads. The MANA III protocol also has the same channels. But instead of asking
users to enter PINs into both devices, it requires users to read a short number from
one device and enter it into the other device. Since the short number is randomly
generated by one device, it is no longer a personal identification number. In other
words, users do not have to remember any PIN under the MANA III protocol. Figure
6.1.4 shows the MANA III protocol.
MANA III is also based on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. It uses
gAB mod p as the session key. Two devices first exchange two exponential random
numbers and derive gAB mod p as their intermediate keys. One device then generates
a short random number (SR) and displays it on its screen. A user then enters the same
number into the other device. The number is XORed with the intermediate key to
form a session key. For authentication, instead of using a challenge-response scheme,
MANA III uses a hash commitment scheme. Each device generates a 128 bits
random number (R) and calculates a long hashed commitment (H) based on R, the
session key, and a device ID. They first exchange their commitment to each other.
They then release R to each other in order to verify the correctness of the
commitments that they have received. The sequence of exchanging commitments and
releasing random numbers is important. One device must not release its R unless it
has received a commitment from the other device. At the end of the protocol, the
authentication results have to be communicated back to the users through the physical
channel again. This last step is essential because without it Trendy can use Bob’s
commitment to brute-force search for the SR. Because SR is a short digit number,
recovering SR by brute-force searching on the commitment and response pair will be
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easy. Once Trendy recovered the SR, he can complete the mutual authentication with
Alice by generating a valid commitment. Figure 6.1.5 describes this attack.

M

S

Generate random A
gA mod p

Generate random B

gB mod p
Enter SR

Display SR
Generate RA

Generate RB

H (IDA, K, RA) Î HA

H (IDB, K, RB) Î HB
HA
HB
RA
RB

Shows auth results

Shows auth results

Figure 6.1.4 MANA III
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Alice

Trendy

HA

Bob

Any number
HB
Any number
RB

Brute-Force search for
SR using HB and RB
Calculate valid
HC and RC based
on SR
HC
RA
RC
Authentication Complete

Figure 6.1.5 A MiM attack on MANA III (without displaying authentication
results)
The fact that user interactions are needed twice (exchanging SR and
displaying Auth Results) is a very undesirable property of the protocol. Thus, a
MANA III variant is proposed in this paper. Figure 6.1.6 shows the MANA III
variant protocol. Couple modifications are made in the original MANA III in order to
eliminate the need to communicate authentication results back to the users.
1. SR will be displayed only after the master has sent its commitment.
The protocol pauses until the user entered SR into the slave device.
2. The slave will only disclose its RB if and only if HA is valid.
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M

S

Generate random A

Generate random B
gA mod p
gB mod p

Generate SR & RA
K = g(B)A mod p XOR SR
E1(BD_ADDRA, K, RA) Î HA
HA
Enter SR

Display SR

Generate RB
K = g(A)B mod p XOR SR

HB

E1(BD_ADDRB, K, RB) Î HB

RA
Valid HA ?

NO Î STOP

YES

RB

Figure 6.1.6 MANA III Variant

Notice that the challenge-response scheme used by the original Bluetooth
design cannot be used in this protocol. Otherwise, a MiM attack will be feasible.
Figure 6.1.7 demonstrates this attack. By using a challenge-response pair from Bob,
Trendy can launch a brute-force search for SR. Once Trendy recovered SR, he will
be able to complete the mutual authentication with Alice by calculating a correct
SRES.
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Alice

Trendy
AU_RANDA

Bob
AU_RANDC
SRESC

Brute-Force search for
SR using AU_RANDC
and SRESC
Calculate the
Correct SRESA
SRESA

Authentication Complete

Figure 6.1.7 A MiM attack on MANA III (with challenge-response scheme)
B. MANA III variant against different attack scenarios
This subsection demonstrates how the new protocol defense against different
attacks
i) A MiM attack on the MANA III that doesn’t displaying authentication results
How does the MANA III variant eliminate the last step from the original
MANA III protocol and, at the same time, protect itself from the MiM attack that we
have described earlier? Lets take a look at couple different situations where Trendy
targets a different victim.
a) Bob as the victim
In this case, Trendy is trying to pair with Bob. Figure 6.1.8
shows the attack. An important observation is that if Trendy doesn’t
commit HC to Bob, Bob will never show the prompt for entering SR.
Assume that Trendy has recovered SR, he still cannot find a valid RC
for generating HC because he has already made a commitment to Bob.
Since RC is a long nonce and E1 is a one-way hash function, it’s not
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feasible for Trendy to brute-force search for a valid RC that is
associated with his commitment to Bob.

Trendy

Alice (M)

HA

Bob (S)

HC
Enter SR

Display SR
Any number

HB

RA
Brute-Force search for
SR using HA and RA and
calculate K
** Infeasible **
Find RC s.t.
E1(BD_ADDRB, K, RC) Î HC

RC **Infeasible**
RB

Figure 6.1.8 MiM attack on MANA III variant (I)
b) Alice as the victim
In this scenario, Trendy is trying to pair with Alice. Figure
6.1.9 shows the attack. Since Trendy doesn’t know SR at the
beginning of the attack, HC will not be a valid commitment. Bob will
end the transaction because of the invalid HC. In other words, he will
never send out RB that he used to calculate HB. Trendy will have
nothing to validate the correctness of a candidate SR.
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Trendy

Alice (M)

HA

Bob (S)

HC
Enter SR

Display SR
HB
RC

Valid HC ?

NO Î STOP

Figure 6.1.9 MiM attack on MANA III variant (II)

ii) Diffie-Hellman MiM attack
The short random number provides authentication to the protocol. Although
Trendy can still substitutes his own gX and gY as in Figure 6.1.2, he will not be able to
get the session key because he doesn’t know SR.

iii) Passive Brute-Force attack on SR
In this attack, Trendy attempted to launch an offline brute-force attack on SR
by using all the messages that he has captured during a pairing and authentication
session between Alice and Bob. Figure 6.1.10 shows this attempted attack. The
attack essentially fails on step five. If the candidate hash H does not equal to HA,
Trendy cannot conclude that the candidate SR is wrong because he doesn’t know gAB
mod p’. He could have guessed the correct SR and H’ would still not equal to HA due
to an incorrect candidate gAB mod p’.
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Msgs captured:
gA mod p, gB mod p, HA, HB, RA, RB

1. Generate a candidate gAB mod p’

2. Generate a candidate SR’

3. Calculate a candidate K’
K’ = gAB mod p’ XOR SR’

4. Calculate a candidate hash H’
H’ = E1(BD_ADDRA, K’, RA)

5. H’ == HA

NO

YES

6. SR found

Figure 6.1.10 An attempted brute-force SR search under MANA III Variant
C. Pros and Cons
In this protocol, an SR is no longer a personal identification number because it
is being generated randomly every time. This also means that users will no longer be
required to memorize their PINs. Furthermore, only one manual entry of numbers is
required for each round of pairing and authentication.
A drawback regarding MANA III variant is that it has a different interface
requirement comparing to the original Bluetooth design. MANA III variant requires
masters to have output interfaces to display short numbers.

6.2 Denial-Of-Service Attack
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The main reason why the DOS attack will work is because of the
exponentially increased authentication wait time mechanism recommended by the
Bluetooth specification. Without this feature, the DOS attack will not work. Thus, by
using protocols with manual channels, such as the one in the MANA III variant
suggested in the previous section, the exponential wait time mechanism is no longer
required. The DOS attack is no longer feasible.
Here is why a manual channel can prevent Trendy from trying different PINs
in a short period of time. If an extra step of copying and entering a short number is
introduced in the original Bluetooth authentication protocol (assuming that the short
number is used to generate an authentication response), Trendy can on longer write a
script to automate the authentication process. He has to physically read a short
number from the master device and enter the number to his probing slave for each
PIN that he tries. Since each trial takes more time to finish, recovering PINs using
this technique is not feasible. The exponentially increased authentication wait time
mechanism is no longer necessary. The DOS attack will then be prevented.

6.3 Encryption Replay Attack
An important observation regarding this replay attack is that only random
numbers from the master are used to generate the 96 bits ACO and KC for encryption.
This attack can be prevented as long as both sides contribute to the creation of the
encryption keys and cipher streams.
One straightforward solution is to use the ACOs from both sides to generate
KC. But since mutual authentication is optional, there may be chances where only
one side has an ACO. In order to guarantee that cipher streams depend on both
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masters and slaves, an extra EN_RAND can be exchanged. Figure 6.3.1 shows the
protocol.
Alice

Bob
Authentication
EN_RANDA
EN_RANDB

Calculate KC and
KCipher using
EN_RANDA and
EN_RANDB

Calculate KC and
KCipher using
EN_RANDA and
EN_RANDB

Figure 6.3.1 Encryption protocol with two encryption random numbers

7 Conclusion
This paper has studied four attacks, an online PIN attack, an offline PIN attack,
a denial-of-service attack, and an encrypted message replay attack, on the Bluetooth
protocol. They revealed the weaknesses on the pairing, challenge-response
authentication, and encryption protocols. The paper proposed PW-EKE and MANA
III variant as alternatives for the original pairing and authentication protocol. By
adding an extra manual channel to the authentication protocol, repeated PIN trying on
fix-pined Bluetooth devices is not feasible. The DOS attack can then be prevented
because the exponential wait time mechanism is no longer required. The reason why
the Bluetooth system is vulnerable to the encrypted message replay attack is because
only random numbers from the master are used to derive cipher streams. Adding an
extra step to exchange an encryption random number generated by the slave will
protect the encryption protocol from generating the same cipher keys and streams.
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